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GOVERNMENT ACTION UNDER CIVIL STATUTE:
EFFECT OF PRIOR CRIMINAL ACQUITTAL
THE DOCTRINE of res judicata precludes identical parties from litigating
the same issues in successive civil proceedings.' The Constitution pro-
hibits a second trial of an accused for the same criminal offense.2  It is
well settled that the outcome of a civil proceeding is not binding upon
a partyto a later criminal action;3 conversely, the outcome of a criminal
prosecution is not conclusive upon any issue in a subsequent civil action. 4
Certain complexities are encountered, however, where the Government
has prescribed by statute that some act or omission may give rise to both
criminal and civil proceedings.' Under these statutes, it is generally
held that a conviction in an earlier criminal action is determinative of
the issues therein resolved for the purposes of a later civil action, despite
the nature of the second action, because such issues have been previously
determined under a more onerous standard of proof."
It is not clear, however, what effect an acquittal in a prior criminal
action has upon a subsequent civil proceeding when both actions were
'See generally, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 88
('952).
'U.S. CONST. amend. V; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.s. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). See
also CoRwIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNOTATED, 837-41 (195.).
' The reasons usually ascribed for this result are that the parties to the actions are
not the same, that the amount of proof necessary to convict is greater than the amount
needed to recover in a civil action and that to allow a civil judgment to affect a
subsequent criminal proceeding would deprive the accused of his constitutional right to
confrontation by accusing witnesses. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 658 (sth ed. I925).
United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 195o ) ; United States v.
Konovsky, 2o2 F.zd 721 (7th Cir. 1953).
" Regardless of the outcome of the criminal prosecution, one who has been damaged
by another ordinarily has a claim for redress which is independent of the state's right to
proceed against the accused. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 653 (sth ed. 1975);
Chantangco v. Abaroa, 2x8 U.S. 476 (r9xo), Stone v. United States , x67 U.S. 178
(1897).
'See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 5174, 56o6, 56o8, providing that every
person having in his control any distilling equipment shall'register it and post a bond
thereon and that all distilled spirits must be manufactured in an authorized distillation
plant or the manufacturer will be subject to certain criminal penalties.
Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 5oo5(b) every possessor or party interested in
distillery apparatus is liable for a tax upon the spirits produced therefrom.
'Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (193); 2
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 657 (Sth ed. 1925).
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instituted by the Government.7  This question was recently raised in
the case of Inman v. United States.' There had been an acquittal in a
prosecution alleging violation of criminal statutes pertaining to the
illicit distillation of alcoholic spirits. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue subsequently assessed a tax on the defendant in the previous
criminal action as being an interested party in certain distilling equip-
ment and mash which had been seized. The District Court, in ordering
a refund, concluded that, since the jury in the criminal action had found
that the taxpayer had no interest in the illicit spirits or the equipment,
this issue, basic in both actions, had been litigated once and for all and
could not again be the basis for any punishment. 9
In upsetting the tax assessment, the court found authority in Coffey
v. United States,'" where the Supreme Court held that an acquittal in
a criminal action was conclusive in a subsequent proceeding in rem
involving the same subject matter." In this case, the Court seemed to
suggest two legal bases for the rule, the doctrine of res judicata and the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy. 2 Critics have gen-
erally argued, however, that neither of these legal principles presents an
adequate foundation for the rule.'
"E.g., United States v. 2iso Cases of Champagne, 9 F.zd 710 (ad Cir. 1926);
United States v. A Lot of Precious Stones, 134 Fed. 61 (6th Cir. 19o5) ; United States
v. One De Soto Sedan, 95 F. Supp. 245 (E.D.N.C. 1949), holding that a prior ac-
quittal in a criminal action instituted by the government precludes a subsequent civil
proceeding. Contra, United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile, 227 F.2d 668 (4 th Cir.
1955) ; United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741 ( 9th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Physic,
175 F.zd 338 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Certain Bottles of Lee's "Save the Baby,"
37 F.zd 137 (D.C. Conn. 1929). The cases are collected in Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d
1132
, 
1142 (1953).-
a 151 F. Supp. 784 (W.D.S.C. 1957).
Old. at 786.
10 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
" The defendant had been acquitted of attempting to defraud the government of
revenue by the alteration of revenue stamps which he allegedly intended to place
on casks of liquor. The Government then instituted a civil action to seize the liquor.
12 xx6 U.S. at 443-45.
1"E.g., McLaren, The Doctrine of Res Judicata As Applied to the Trial of
Criminal Cases, 1o WASH. L. REv. 198 (1935) ; Legis. Note, 51 HARV. L. Rav. 1o92
(1938); Note, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 291 (1931); 47 HARV. L. REV. 1438 (934)i
37 MIcH. L. Rav. 647 (1938); Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 839 (1939). The dissatisfaction
with the Coffey rule has caused the courts to limit severely its application. See United
States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile, 222 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Gramer,
191 F.zd 741 ( 9 th Cir. 1951). The impairment of the efficacy of this rule reached
such proportions that one court remarked that "only the shibboleth of stare decisis
has saved the Coffey rule from express repudiation." United States v. One Dodge Sedan,
113 F.2d 552, 553 ( 3 d Cir. 194o).
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If the Coffey rule is bottomed in the doctrine of res judicata, it may
effectively be impaired by the argument that the parties and the issues
in the two actions are at least technically different. 4 A more cogent
criticism of the rule recognizes the differences in the degrees of proof
required in civil and criminal actions,' 5 as well as the accompanying dif-
ferences in rules of evidence' and procedure.' If the Coffey rule
depends upon giving breadth to the protections against double jeopardy,
an inconsistency appears when the complement of the rule, that a prior
conviction is no bar to a later civil proceeding, is considered.'8 Another
attack might rest on the probable legislative intent; the problem most
frequently arises under statutes which create from a single occurrence
two separate causes of action, one civil and one penal. It may be argued,
therefore, that the legislature, when drafting these statutes, intended that
there should be no bar to a second proceeding.'" Finally, there is a
pragmatic defect in the rule: Under identical circumstances as to two
separate defendants, if the Government should proceed first in the
criminal court against defendant A and fail, the civil remedy is not
recoverable as against A. If, however, the Government should proceed
" See Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1897), where the Court noted the
dissimilarity of issues between criminal and civil trials.
In order that res judicata be applicable, there must be identity of parties. United
States v. Certain Bottles of Lee's "Save the Baby," 37 F.2d 137 (D.C. Conn. 1929)
(no evidence that the same persons composed a partnership at the time of both
actions) ; United States v. One Dodge Sedan, 113 F.2d 552 ( 3 d Cir. 1940) (wife of the
acquitted driver of "convoy" car allowed to prove inculpability of car).
15 Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897) ; Murphy v. United States, 272
U.S. 630 (1926). The distinction announced by the Court is that for conviction the
guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action liability may be predicated upon merely a preponderance of the evidence.
"6 E.g., generally the good or bad character of either party to a civil action is
inadmissible; however in a criminal action the character of a defendant may be at-
tacked only after the defendant has put into issue his own good character. Roberson v.
State, 91 Okla. Crim. 217, 218 P.2d 414 (950).
"
7 E.g., the privilege of a criminal defendant to refuse to testify against himself as
opposed to the absence of such a privilege in a civil action. 2 FREEMAN JUDGMEN §
654 (sth ed. 1925).
" See Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (931).
See also note 3 supra.
19 Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 5x F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C. 1943).
An injunction under the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 2o9 (i89o), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
H 1, 4, was granted although the defendants -had beerr previously acquitted in an action
where the Government sought criminal actions against a combination in restraint of trade.
Similarly the Internal Revenue Code makes provision for both civil and/or criminal
actions based upon the same act or omission. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537 (1943)- See note S supra.
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first against defendant B in a civil action, it might recover judgment
under the less rigorous standard of proof and yet fail in the later criminal
action. Thus civil recovery might depend upon the fortuity of the
character of the initial action.
Some authorities contend that much of the effect of the Coffey case
has been attenuated by the later case of Helvering v. Mitchell,0 where
the Supreme Court ruled that an acquittal in a prior criminal action
would not bar subsequent proceedings which are civil or remedial
in nature as distinguished from those which are criminal or penal. A
cursory examination of these two cases could lead to the conclusion that
the latter case has virtually all but overruled the former. Despite the
antithetical results, however, a closer analysis reveals a common point
upon which both cases may be rested, i.e., the concern of the Court to
thwart government efforts to use a disguised civil action as a vehicle to
impose otherwise unavailable criminal sanctions.2
In Inman v. United States, the court preferred to follow the Coffey
rule, and evidently felt that the levying of a tax upon mash fit for
distillation was inherently based on violation of the criminal laws,222
although the applicable section of the Internal Revenue Code has been
judicially interpreted otherwise 3 Assuming the court's conclusion in
the Inman case to be correct, although it may be argued that the Govern-
ment was merely seeking to obtain payment for the privilege of manu-
facturing alcoholic spirits,24 the Mitchell case could have been used more
20 303 U.S. 391 (938) (upholding the assessment of a statutory fraud penalty
upon a taxpayer who, in a previous criminal action, had been acquitted of filing a
fraudulent return).
" In the Coffey case the court held that there could be no new trial of the accused
after a previous acquittal, and that a subsequent trial, ostensibly civil, was fundamental-
ly criminal when the only distinction between the two was the consequence following
judgment. xs6 U.S. at 443. This conclusion may have been premised upon an old
notion that a forfeiture action was inherently criminal. Various Items of Personal
Property v. United States, a2 U.S. 577 (1930. It seems that the decision in the
Coffey case was motivated by the same considerations which underlie the safeguard
against double jeopardy. Under the Mitchell rule this consideration is retained by
employing the concept of an action penal in nature as opposed to one civil in nature.
22 i~z F. Supp. at 786.
2' See also, United States v. United States Industrial Alcohol Co., 103 F.2d 97
( 4th Cir. 1939), where the legislative history of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5oo5(b),
is examined. See also, Hudson v. Crenshaw, 224 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1955) i Ferroni
v. United States, 53 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 193).
2' See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), where it was argued that
it would be anomalous to require a tax from a licensed manufacturer and not from
an illict distiller.
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effectively to reach the same conclusion through exploitation of the
distinction between remedial and penal sanctions.2 Thus, a just result,
barring successive criminal actions, could be obtained without impeding
the collection of bona fide taxes and civil statutory penalties.
2 Because these concepts are not rigidly defined, the court could more easily examine
the actual object and the purpose of the-action. Cf. United States v. La Franca, 282
U.S. 568 (1931)i Murray & Sorenson v. United States, 207 F.2d 119 (ist Cir. 1953).
